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What is the relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate? The empirical literature in this
area has been inconclusive. We use an optimizing model of a small open economy to rationalize the
mixed empirical findings. The model has three key margins. First, higher domestic interest rates raise
the demand for deposits, and, hence, the money base. Second, firms need bank loans to finance the
wage bill, which reduces output when domestic interest rates increase. Lastly, higher interest rates
raise the government’s fiscal burden, and, therefore, can lead to higher expected inflation. While the
first effect tends to appreciate the currency, the remaining two effects tend to depreciate it. We then
conduct policy experiments using a calibrated version of the model and show the central result of the
paper: the relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate is non-monotonic. In particular,
the exchange rate response depends on the size of the interest rate increase and on the initial level
of the interest rate. Moreover, we also show that the model can replicate the heterogeneous responses
of the exchange rate to interest rate innovations in several developing economies.
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In this paper we show, both theoretically and quantitatively, that the relationship between nominal
interest rates and the nominal exchange rate is inherently non-monotonic. We formalize a small
open economy model where higher interest rates have three eﬀects. They raise the ﬁscal burden
on the government, reduce output due to higher working capital costs, and raise the demand for
domestic currency assets. The ﬁrst two eﬀects tend to depreciate the currency while the last eﬀect
tends to appreciate the currency. The net exchange rate response to interest innovations depends
on the relative strengths of these opposing forces. We calibrate the model to developing economies.
We use the quantitative model to show that a permanent increase in the policy-controlled interest
rate has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the steady state exchange rate: for small increases in the
interest rate the exchange rate appreciates but for larger increases it depreciates. We also compute
model-generated impulse responses of the exchange rate to temporary interest rate innovations
and demonstrate that these are similarly non-monotonic. As a ﬁnal test, we demonstrate that the
model can replicate the disparate responses of the exchange rate to interest rate innovations across
three diﬀerent countries: Thailand, Korea, and Brazil. We interpret our results as providing a
rationalization for the failure of standard empirical methods to detect any systematic relationship
between interest rates and exchange rates in the data.
The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates has long been a key focus of interna-
tional economics. Most standard theoretical models of exchange rates predict that exchange rates
are determined by economic fundamentals, one of which is the interest rate diﬀerential between
home and abroad. However, a consistent result in the empirical literature is that a random-walk
exchange rate forecasting model usually outperforms fundamental-based forecasting models. In
other words, most models do not explain exchange rates movements (see Meese (1990)). This
fact is highlighted in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) who call it the “exchange rate disconnect puzzle”.
Moreover, studies that have directly examined the relationship between interest rates and exchange
rates have typically found mixed and/or conﬂicting results. Thus, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
ﬁnd that for the G7 countries interest rate innovations tend to appreciate the currency. On the
other hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ﬁnd that for developing countries there is no systematic
relationship between the two variables. On a related theme, Drazen and Hubrich (2006) show that
during the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992, currency forecasts reacted
non-monotonically to interest rate increases with near term appreciations being accompanied by
1long term depreciations of forecasted currency values.
The absence of a clear empirical relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate is even
more problematic from the perspective of applied practitioners. A short-term interest rate is the
typical policy instrument used by policymakers to aﬀect currency values (and monetary conditions
more generally).1 If there is no clear relationship in the data, then why do policymakers persist
in using the interest rate instrument to aﬀect exchange rates? Or, for example, why do observers
today argue that the rapid reduction in the federal funds rate over the last six months is partly
responsible for the continuous slide of the dollar in international currency markets? The goal of
our work is thus two-fold. First, we want to explore in greater conceptual detail the relationship
between interest rates (both policy-controlled and market determined) and the nominal exchange
rate and in the process clarify the tradeoﬀs that are typically faced by policymakers. Second, we
want to use insights from the ﬁrst exercise to facilitate a rationalization of the mixed empirical
results regarding this relationship.
We should note at the outset that our paper is not concerned with the relationship between the
nominal market interest rate and the rate of currency depreciation. There is a voluminous literature
which attempts to document and/or explain this relationship. This literature is concerned with the
failure of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition (the “forward premium anomaly”). In our
model interest parity holds for internationally traded bonds. Hence, we do not shed any new light
on the observed deviations from UIP. Instead, our main focus is on the eﬀects of policy-induced
changes in nominal interest rates on the level of the exchange rate.
In the context of the model described above, we ﬁnd that the relationship between interest rates
and the nominal exchange rate is non-monotonic under fairly general conditions. In particular, as
long as the interest elasticity of money demand is increasing in the relevant opportunity costs,
an increase in the policy-controlled interest rate will raise the elasticity of cash demand since the
nominal interest rate rises. Simultaneously, the elasticity of demand for deposits falls since the
opportunity cost of deposits (the nominal interest rate less the deposit rate) declines. Hence, the
negative eﬀect on money demand coming from cash rises with the domestic interest rate while
1We should note that, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, there was a contentious debate
regarding the soundness of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) advice to aﬀected countries of raising interest
rates to stabilize the rapidly depreciating domestic currencies. IMF critics (like Joseph Stiglitz and Jeﬀrey Sachs)
were of the view that this policy may not even worked and, even if it did, its costs would be just too high. In fact,
a large empirical literature on the topic has failed to unearth a systematic eﬀect of higher interest on the currency
values during the crisis period in the aﬀected Asian economies (see Kraay (2003)).
2the positive eﬀect coming from deposits becomes gradually smaller. This implies that as long as
deposit demand is more elastic than cash demand for low domestic interest rates, initially money
demand will rise with the interest rate since the demand deposit eﬀect dominates. However, beyond
a certain point, the negative cash eﬀect overwhelms the positive demand deposit eﬀect and money
demand begins to fall. This non-monotonicity of real money demand maps into a non-monotonicity
of the nominal exchange rate: for small increases in the domestic interest rate the exchange rate
appreciates but once money demand begins to fall the exchange rate depreciates. The associated
negative eﬀect on output of changes in the domestic interest rate adds an additional negative eﬀect
to money demand but does not change this basic intuition.
While the theoretical linkages are instructive, our main interest lies in determining whether
these non-monotonicities can arise in a realistically parameterized model that embodies the channels
speciﬁed above. Toward that end, we calibrate our model to Argentinean data so that the model
can reproduce the key unconditional moments of real variables in the Argentinean economy between
1983-2002. We then use the calibrated model to conduct interest rate experiments. We show three
main results. First, the steady state response of the nominal exchange rate to increases in the steady
state domestic policy-controlled interest rate is non-monotonic. Second, the impulse response of
the exchange rate to a temporary one standard deviation increase in the interest rate is also non-
monotonic: for economies with low steady state interest rates, a temporary increase in the interest
rate appreciates the exchange rate while for high interest rate economies the same sized increase
in interest rates depreciates the currency. Third, the response of the exchange rate to transitory
interest rate innovations depends on the size of the shock. For small increases in the interest rate,
the domestic currency appreciates; for large increases in the interest rate, it depreciates. We also
provide a quantitative assessment for the relevant ranges of the interest rate.
As a ﬁnal step, we recalibrate our model to three developing countries: Thailand, Korea, and
Brazil. Despite their similarities along many dimensions, these countries are distinct in that they
exhibit diﬀerent exchange rate responses to interest rate innovations. We show that the model-
generated impulse responses of exchange rates can reproduce the data-generated impulse responses.
These results suggest that our model has the capacity to explain diﬀerent exchange rate responses
b a s e do nc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁcm e a s u r a b l ep a r a m e t e r s .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some empirical evidence
from a number of developing and developed countries detailing the mixed results on the relationship
between interest rates and the exchange rate. Section 3 presents the model while Section 4 builds
3some analytical insights by studying some special cases of the model. Section 5 discusses how the
model is calibrated and solved, while Section 6 presents our quantitative results using the calibrated
model. Section 7 compares the country speciﬁc impulse responses from the model with the data.
The last section concludes.
2 Empirical motivation
We start oﬀ by empirically documenting our motivating issue (the lack of a systematic relationship
between interest rates and the exchange rate) through a look at the data. We study the relationship
by estimating unrestricted vector autoregressions (VARs) on a country-by-country basis for a sample
of ten countries. Our sample includes six developing countries — Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Thailand,
Peru and Philippines — and four developed countries — Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United
States.
For our sample we chose a representative mix of developed and developing countries. We focus
on periods during which the exchange rate in these countries was ﬂoating, so the starting date
varies from country to country. Here we report the empirical results from the subsample ending
in 2001.2 W ea l s oi n v e s t i g a t e dt h ee v i d e n c ef o rt h ee n t i r ep e r i o de n d i n gi n2 0 0 7 . T h er e s u l t s
remained qualitatively unchanged for all countries except for Brazil and Thailand. We explore
these two countries and their changing responses in greater detail below in Section 7. We chose to
examine the periods 1997 — 2001 and 1997 — 2007 separately as there was a perceptible diﬀerence in
monetary conditions between the two. During the period 1997-2001 the interest rate was used very
actively by a number of central banks to defend against speculative attacks on their currencies. In
contrast, the period 2001-2007 was one of relative tranquility in international currency markets. As
a result interest rates were much less volatile during the latter phase relative to the ﬁrst sub-sample.
We estimate country-speciﬁc four variable VARs using monthly data on nominal exchange rates
(domestic currency units per U.S. dollar, period average), short term interest rate diﬀerentials
between home and abroad (domestic minus U.S. Federal Funds rate), industrial production (index,
2000 base year) and government ﬁscal balance.3 We express the ﬁscal balance data in terms of
2The sample periods are as follows: Brazil 1998:12 — 2001:03; Mexico 1995:01 — 2001:03; Peru 1992:01 — 2001:03;
Korea 1997:07 — 2001:03; Thailand 1997:07 — 2001:03; and Phillipines 1983:01 — 2001:03. We chose four major
developed countries as a control group. The sample period for developed countries is 1974:01 — 2001:03.
3Whenever available, we use the interest payments data instead of the ﬁscal balance data in order to have more
accurate correspondence with the model-generated series.
4U.S. currency and then normalize the resulting numbers across countries by expressing them in
per capita terms.4 For the United States, the exchange rate is expressed in terms of dollar per
yen while the interest rate diﬀerential is the U.S. minus the Japanese short term interest rate.
Since monthly ﬁscal data for all countries in our sample is highly seasonal and volatile, we use the
11-month centered moving average instead. Our data is from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS).5
We use the estimated VARs to calculate the impulse response of the exchange rate, industrial
production, and the ﬁscal balance to an orthogonalized one standard deviation innovation in the
interest rate diﬀerential between home and abroad for each country. Following Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) we compute the impulse responses using the following ordering: industrial production,
interest rate diﬀerential, exchange rate, and ﬁscal balance.6
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response of the nominal exchange rate (with a one standard
deviation signiﬁcance band) to a one standard deviation orthogonalized innovation in the interest
rate diﬀerential. The picture reveals mixed results. Within the set of developed countries, in
Canada, Germany and Italy there is a signiﬁcant appreciation of the currency in response to an
increase in the interest rate diﬀerential. This is the well-known result of Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995). For the developing group the eﬀect is mostly the opposite. Except for Thailand, in all
countries a positive innovation in the interest rate diﬀerential between home and the United States
induces a signiﬁcant depreciation of the currency. Thailand, on the other hand, shows a signiﬁcant
appreciation of the currency in response to an interest rate innovation.
However, even for the developed countries the relationship between interest rates and exchange
rates is not stable over time. Thus, for the U.S. we split the sample into two sub-periods — 1974:01
— 1990:05 and 1990:06 — 2001:03. Note that the ﬁrst sub-period corresponds to the period analyzed
in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). As can be seen from the last row of Figure 1, the exchange rate
eﬀect of an interest rate innovation is diﬀerent in the two sub-periods. For 1974:01—1990:05 we
see the standard result - a positive innovation in the interest rate diﬀerential between the US and
Japan causes a signiﬁcant exchange rate appreciation. However, this relationship is reversed for
the latter period in which the dollar depreciates relative to the yen in response to an innovation in
4We express the ﬁscal balance in this form in order to keep the measured ﬁscal balance in the data consistent with
the way it is measured in the model that we present later.
5For the interest rate data, we use short term money market rates. For the U.S., the series used is the Federal
Funds rate.
6The Akaike criterion was used to choose the lag length.
5the same interest rate diﬀerential.7
Our evidence is thus consistent with the lack of a systematic relationship between interest
rates and the exchange rate in the data. As can be seen in Figure 1, this puzzle exists both on a
cross-country basis as well as on a time series basis.































































































7We also estimated the VAR system for these countries for the entire sample ending in 2007:10. The results
remained qualitatively unchanged for all countries except for Brazil and Thailand. We explore these two countries
and their changing responses in greater detail below in Section 7.
63 The model
Consider a representative household model of a small open economy that is perfectly integrated
with the rest of the world in both goods and capital markets. The inﬁnitely-lived household receives
utility from consuming a (non-storable) good and disutility from supplying labor. The world price
of the good in terms of foreign currency is ﬁxed and normalized to unity. Free goods mobility across
borders implies that the law of one price applies. The consumer can also trade freely in perfectly
competitive world capital markets by buying and selling real bonds which are denominated in terms
of the good and pay r units of the good as interest at every point in time.
3.1 Households




βtU (ct,x t), (1)
where c denotes consumption, x denotes labor supply, and β(> 0) is the exogenous and constant






1−σ , ζ > 0, ν > 1.
Here σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ν − 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the real wage. These preferences are well-known from the work of Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988), which we will refer to as GHH.8
Households use cash, H, and nominal demand deposits, D, for reducing transactions costs.












where P is the nominal price of goods in the economy, and s denotes the non-negative transactions
costs incurred by the consumer. Let h (= H/P) denote cash and let d (= D/P) denote interest-
bearing demand deposits in real terms. We assume that the transactions technology is strictly
8These preferences have been widely used in the real business cycle literature as they provide a better description
of consumption and the trade balance for small open economies than alternative speciﬁcations (see, for instance,
Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995)). As will become clear below, the key analytical simpliﬁcation introduced by
GHH preferences is that there is no wealth eﬀect on labor supply.
7convex. In particular, the functions v(h)a n dψ(d), deﬁned for h ∈ [0,¯ h], ¯ h>0, and d ∈ [0, ¯ d],
¯ d>0, respectively, satisfy the following properties:
v ≥ 0,v 0 ≤ 0,v 00 > 0,v 0(¯ h)=v(¯ h)=0 ,
ψ ≥ 0, ψ0 ≤ 0, ψ00 > 0, ψ0(¯ d)=ψ(¯ d)=0 .
Thus, additional cash and demand deposits lower transactions costs but at a decreasing rate. The
assumption that v0(¯ h)=ψ0(¯ d) = 0 ensures that the consumer can be satiated with real money
balances.
In addition to the two liquid assets, households also hold a real internationally-traded bond, b,
and physical capital, k, which they can rent out to ﬁrms. The households ﬂow budget constraint
in nominal terms is
Ptbt+1 + Dt + Ht + Pt (ct + It + st + κt)
= Pt
³











Foreign bonds are denominated in terms of the good and pay the gross interest factor R(= 1 + r),
which is constant over time. id
t denotes the deposit rate contracted in period t − 1 and paid in
period t. w and ρ denote the wage and rental rates. τ denotes lump-sum transfers received from
the government. Ωf and Ωb represent dividends from ﬁrms and banks respectively. κ denotes
capital adjustment costs
κt = κ(It,k t−1), κI > 0,κII > 0, (3)
i.e., adjustment costs are convex in investment. Lastly,
It = kt − (1 − δ)kt−1. (4)
In real terms the ﬂow budget constraint facing the representative household is thus given by
bt+1 + ht + dt + ct + It + st + κt (5)













where Ωf and Ωb denote dividends received by households from ﬁrms and banks, respectively.
1+πt = Pt
Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of inﬂation between periods t − 1a n dt.I t i s u s e f u l t o
note that the uncovered interest parity condition dictates that expected returns from investing in
8domestic nominal bonds and international real bonds must be equalized. Hence, recalling that
Pt+1/Pt =1+πt+1,
1+it+1 = REt (1 + πt+1).
Households maximize their lifetime welfare equation (1) subject to equations (2), (3), (4) and
(5).
3.2 Firms
The representative ﬁrm in this economy produces the perishable good using a constant returns to
scale technology over capital and labor
yt = F (kt−1,A tlt)=Atkα
t−1l1−α
t , (6)
with α > 0, and At denoting the current state of productivity which is stochastic. l is labor
demand. At the beginning of the period, ﬁrms observe shocks for the period and then make
production plans. They rent capital and labor. However, a fraction φ of the total wage bill needs
to be paid upfront to workers. Since output is only realized at the end of the period, ﬁrms ﬁnance
this payment through loans from banks. The loan amount along with the interest is paid back to
banks next period.9 Formally, this constraint is given by
Nt = φPtwtlt, φ > 0, (7)
where N denotes the nominal value of bank loans. The assumption that ﬁrms must use bank credit
to pay the wage bill is needed to generate a demand for bank loans.
The ﬁrm’s ﬂow constraint in nominal terms is given by
Ptb
f














where il is the lending rate charged by bank for their loans and Ωf denotes dividends paid out by
the ﬁrms to their shareholders. bf denotes foreign bonds held by ﬁrms which pay the going world
interest factor R. In real terms the ﬂow constraint reduces to
b
f








nt−1 + yt − wtlt − ρtkt−1 − Ω
f
t .
9Alternatively, we could assume that bank credit is an input in the production function, in which case the derived














Substituting this expression together with the credit-in-advance constraint into the ﬁrm’s ﬂow




























nt is the additional resource cost that
is incurred by ﬁrms due to the credit-in-advance constraint.10
The ﬁrm chooses a path of l and k to maximize the present discounted value of dividends subject
to equations (6), (7) and (8). Given that households own the ﬁrms, this formulation is equivalent
to the ﬁrm using the household’s stochastic discount factor to optimize. The ﬁrst order conditions
for this problem are given by two usual conditions and an Euler equation which is identical to the
household’s Euler equation. The two usual conditions are standard — the ﬁrm equates the marginal
product of the factor to its marginal cost. In the case of labor the cost includes the cost of credit.
This is proportional to the diﬀerence between the nominal lending rate and the nominal interest
rate.
3.3 Banks
The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The representative bank holds foreign
real debt, db, accepts deposits from consumers and lends to both ﬁrms, N, and the government in
the form of domestic government bonds, Z.11 It also holds required cash reserves, θD,w h e r eθ > 0
is the reserve-requirement ratio imposed on the representative bank by the central bank. Banks
face a cost q (in real terms) of managing their portfolio of foreign assets. Moreover, we assume
that banks also face a constant proportional cost φn per unit of loans to ﬁrms. This is intended
10We should note that the credit-in-advance constraint given by equation (7) holds as an equality only along paths
where the lending spread 1+i
l −R(1 + π) is strictly positive. We will assume that if the lending spread is zero, this
constraint also holds with equality.
11Commercial bank lending to governments is particularly common in developing countries. Government debt is
held not only as compulsory (and remunerated) reserve requirements but also voluntarily due to the lack of proﬁtable
investment opportunities in crisis-prone countries. This phenomenon was so pervasive in some Latin American
countries during the 1980’s that Rodriguez (1991) aptly refers to such governments as “borrowers of ﬁrst resort”.
For evidence, see Rodriguez (1991) and Druck and Garibaldi (2000).
10to capture the fact that domestic loans to private ﬁrms are potentially special as banks need to
spend additional resources in monitoring loans to private ﬁrms.12 The nominal ﬂow constraint for
the bank is














Dt−1 + θDt−1 − PtRdb
t − PtΩb
t, (9)
where ig is the interest rate on government bonds. We assume that banking costs are a convex






,q 0 > 0,q 00 > 0,
where q0 denotes the derivative of the function q with respect to its argument, while q00 denotes the
second derivative. The costly banking assumption is needed to break the interest parity condition
between domestic and foreign bonds. Throughout the paper we assume that the banking cost









where γ > 0 is a constant parameter.13





R(1 + πt) − 1
1+πt
¸















where we have used the bank’s balance sheet identity: Ptdb
t+1 = Nt+Zt−(1 − θ)Dt. Note that this
is equivalent to setting the bank’s net worth to zero at all times. Also, the quadratic speciﬁcation for
banking costs along with the zero net worth assumption implies that these banking costs can also be




The representative bank chooses sequences of N, Z,and D to maximize the present discounted
value of proﬁts subject to equations (9) taking as given the paths for interest rates il,i d,i g,i ,and
12We should note that this cost φ
n is needed solely for numerical reasons since, as will become clear below, it
gives us a bigger range of policy-controlled interest rates to experiment with. Qualitatively, all our results would go
through with φ
n =0 .
13Similar treatment of banking costs of managing assets and liabilities can be found in Diaz-Gimenez et al (1992)
and Edwards and V´ egh (1997). This approach to breaking the interest parity condition is similar in spirit to Calvo
and V´ egh (1995).
11the value of θ and φn. We assume that the bank uses the household’s stochastic discount factor to




t+1 are all part of the information set of the household
at time t.




t+1 + φn, (12)
id
t+1 =( 1 − θ)i
g
t+1. (13)
These conditions are intuitive. Loans to ﬁrms and loans to the government are perfect substitutes
from the perspective of commercial banks up to the constant extra marginal cost φn of monitoring
loans to private ﬁrms. Hence, equation (12) says that the interest rate charged by banks on private
loans should equal the rate on loans to the government plus φn. For every unit of deposits held
the representative bank has to pay id as interest. The bank can earn ig by lending out the deposit.
However, it has to retain a fraction θ of deposits as required reserves. Hence, equation (13) shows
that at an optimum the deposit rate must equal the interest on government bonds net of the
resource cost of holding required reserves. We should note that the parameter φn plays no role
in the theoretical results that we derive below. Hence, in our main propositions we set φn =0 .
This parameter is useful in the quantitative sections later where it allows us to calibrate some key
interest rate spreads.
It is instructive to note that as the marginal banking costs becomes larger the bank will choose
to lower its holdings of foreign assets. This can be checked from the bank ﬁrst order conditions; all
of them imply that limγ→∞ db
t+1 =0 . Hence, in the limit as banking costs becomes prohibitively
large, the bank will choose to economize by shifting to a closed banking sector with no external
assets or liabilities.
3.4 Government
The government issues high powered money, M, and domestic bonds, Z, makes lump-sum transfers,
τ, to the public, and sets the reserve requirement ratio, θ, on deposits. Domestic bonds are interest
bearing and pay ig per unit. Since we are focusing on ﬂexible exchange rates, we assume with no
loss of generality that the central bank’s holdings of international reserves are zero. We assume
that the government’s transfers to the private sector are ﬁxed exogenously at ¯ τ for all t. Hence,
the consolidated government’s nominal ﬂow constraint is
Pt¯ τ +( 1+i
g
t)Zt−1 = Mt − Mt−1 + Zt.
12As indicated by the left-hand-side of this expression, total expenditures consist of lump-sum trans-
fers, debt redemption and debt service. These expenditures may be ﬁnanced by issuing either high










Lastly, the rate of growth of the nominal money supply is given by:
Mt
Mt−1
=1+µt,M 0 given. (15)
It is worth noting that from the central bank’s balance sheet the money base in the economy is
given by
Mt = Ht + θDt.
Hence, M can also be interpreted as the level of nominal domestic credit in the economy.
The consolidated government (both the ﬁscal and monetary authorities) has three policy instru-
ments: (a) monetary policy which entails setting the rate of growth of nominal money supply; (b)
interest rate policy which involves setting ig (or alternatively, setting the composition of m and z
and letting ig be market determined); and (c) the level of lump sum transfers to the private sector
τ. Given that lump-sum transfers are exogenously-given, only one of the other two instruments
can be chosen freely while the second gets determined through the government’s ﬂow constraint
(equation (14)). Since the focus of this paper is on the eﬀects of interest rate policy, we shall assume
throughout that ig is an actively chosen policy instrument. This implies that the rate of money
growth µ adjusts endogenously so that equation (14) is satisﬁed.
3.5 Resource constraint
By combining the ﬂow constraints for the consumer, the ﬁrm, the bank, and the government
(equations (5), (8), (11) and (14)) and using equations (6) and (7), we get the economy’s ﬂow
resource constraint:
at+1 = Rat + yt − ct − It − κt − st − qt, (16)
where a = b+bf −db. N o t et h a tt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 1 6 )i ss i m p l yt h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n t .
133.6 Equilibrium relations
We start by deﬁning an equilibrium for this model economy. The three exogenous variables in the
economy are the productivity process A and the two policy variables ¯ τ and ig.W ed e n o t et h ee n t i r e
state history of the economy till date t by st =( s0,s 1,s 2,...,s t). An equilibrium for this economy
is deﬁned as:




























































such that (a) at the prices the allo-
cations solve the problems faced by households, ﬁr m sa n db a n k s ;( b )f a c t o rm a r k e t sc l e a r ;a n d( c )
the government budget constraint (equation (14)) is satisﬁed.
Combining the government ﬂow constraint with the central and commercial bank balance sheets
yields the combined government ﬂow constraint:



















Lastly, for future reference, the nominal interest rate in this economy is given by the standard
no arbitrage condition between a one-period nominal bond bought at time t which pays it+1 as
interest in domestic currency at t + 1 and an international real bond which pays r as interest in
terms of the good:
1+it+1 = REt (1 + πt+1). (18)
4 Exchange rates and interest rate policy: Analytical results
In order to build intuition about the workings of this model, in this section we specialize the model
to derive some analytical results. In particular, we shall focus on stationary environments in which
both the policy-controlled interest rate, ig, and government transfers, ¯ τ,a r ec o n s t a n tf o ra l lt.W e
eliminate capital by setting α =0a n dAt =1f o ra l lt. This also reduces the model to perfect
foresight since there is now no source of uncertainty. Lastly, we set the loan administering cost to
zero so that φn =0 .T h i si m p l i e st h a tig = il at all times.
4.1 Perfect foresight stationary equilibrium
We ﬁrst derive the perfect foresight equilibrium path. Under perfect foresight, the ﬁrst order con-












14Moreover, we know that id





t.M o r e o v e r ,t h eﬁrst order condition for bank
loans to the government implies an equilibrium relationship between deposits and bank loans to
the government:
zt =( 1− θ)dt − nt +
µ
it+1 − r
γ (1 + it+1)
¶
. (19)
where we have used equation (18) to substitute out for R(1 + πt+1).
Using the relationships above it is easy to see the government ﬂow constraint (see equation









1+i for (the absolute value of)
the opportunity-cost elasticity of demand deposits, and ηn ≡−˜ n0
n
il−i
1+i to denote the corresponding
elasticity of loans to ﬁrms. In order to economize on notation we shall also use Id = i − id and
Ig = ig − i to denote the interest spreads on deposits and loans respectively.





> 1, i.e., the



















































To ensure a unique convergent perfect foresight equilibrium path we shall restrict attention to
parameter ranges for which the stability condition holds.14 As long as this condition is satisﬁed,
along any perfect foresight equilibrium path with constant ¯ τ and ig, i will also be constant over
time.
Ac o n s t a n ti and ig imply that π, i − id and ig − i must all be constant over time. In con-
junction with the ﬁrst order conditions for households, ﬁrms and banks, these results imply that
consumption, c,o u t p u t ,x, cash demand, h, deposit demand, d, and demand for bonds, z,m u s ta l l
remain constant as well. The constancy of both h and d implies that money demand is constant






(h + θd) −
µ




Before proceeding further it is useful to note that the left hand side of equation (20) reﬂects
the well-known possibility of a Laﬀer curve relationship between revenues from money printing





< 1 then the economy would exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy. There would
be an inﬁnite number of equilibrium paths all converging to the unique steady state.
15and the opportunity cost of holding money. As is standard, and to ensure that the economy

























In the rest of this section we shall make one additional assumption which will simplify the
analytics greatly. In particular, we shall assume that γ = ∞. This corresponds to assuming that
the cost of managing a non-zero net foreign asset position is prohibitively high for domestic banks.
The implication of this assumption is that commercial banks will set db
t =0f o ra l lt.H e n c e ,t h e
commercial bank balance sheet will reduce to zt + nt =( 1− θ)dt for all t.
4.2 Two special cases
We now turn to the central issue of the paper — the eﬀects of interest rate policy on the nominal
exchange rate. We want to ask the following questions: how does the nominal exchange rate
change when the policy-controlled interest rate, ig, changes? What is the relationship between
the market interest rate, i, and the exchange rate? Our goal is to demonstrate that in the model
just described, there is an inherent tendency for the relationship between interest rates (both ig
and i) and the exchange rate to be non-monotonic. Since uncovered interest parity dictates that
1+it = R(1 + πt), for the rate of currency depreciation to be non-monotonic in ig we need i to
be a non-monotonic function of ig.F o r t h e level of the nominal exchange rate to have a similar
non-monotonicity, m(= h + θd) must be a non-monotonic function of ig. With nominal money
supply at time 0 given, a rise in m will imply that the price level must decrease, i.e., the nominal
exchange rate appreciates. Similarly, a fall in m will be associated with a nominal depreciation.
We also want to determine the minimal elements that are needed to generate such non-monotonicities.
To this eﬀect, we will show that (i) in the presence of only one money (interest-bearing deposits),
both the ﬁscal and the output eﬀects are needed to generate a non-monotonic relationship between
interest rates and the nominal exchange rate, and (ii) in the presence of two monies (cash and
deposits), the ﬁscal eﬀect is all that is needed to generate a non-monotonic relationship. As will be
discussed below, these two cases illustrate the general principle that two sources of ﬁscal revenues
are needed to generate a non-monotonic relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. In
(i), the two sources of revenues are demand deposits and, indirectly, bank lending to ﬁrms (through
its eﬀect on banking lending to the government), whereas in (ii) the two sources of revenues are
the two monies.
164.2.1 Case 1: The one-money case
In this one-money case, higher interest rates have both an output eﬀect and a ﬁscal eﬀect and both
eﬀects are key in generating the non-monotonic relationship between interest rates and exchange






≡ 0). This implies that the entire money base is held by the banking sector. In particular,
m = θd. Hence, after setting h =0a n dγ = ∞, the stability condition (20) remains valid.15
The relationship between the policy-controlled interest rate, ig, and the nominal exchange rate,
E, has three potential non-monotonicities which we describe through the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A permanent, unanticipated change in the policy-controlled interest rate, ig, has
a non-monotonic eﬀect on the equilibrium nominal interest rate along three dimensions: (i) the
initial level of the nominal exchange rate is falling or rising with ig as ig Q ˆ ıg; (ii) the steady-state
depreciation rate falls or rises with ig as ig Q ¯ ıg where ¯ ıg < ˆ ıg; and (iii) in the range ig ∈ (¯ ıg,ˆ ıg),
ar i s ei nig appreciates the currency on impact but depreciates it at some point in the future.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates part (i) of this proposition. Speciﬁcally, the initial level of the exchange
rate, E0, is a U-shaped function of the policy-controlled interest rate, ig, with the minimum being
reached at ig =ˆ ıg. The intuition is as follows. Recall that the opportunity cost of demand
deposits is Id
1+i ≡ i−id
1+i .A r i s e i n ig, in and of itself, increases the deposit rate, id — recall (13) —
and therefore tends to reduce Id
1+i and appreciate the currency. A rising ig,h o w e v e r ,a l s or a i s e sIg
which induces a fall in bank credit to ﬁrms, n.T h i se ﬀect tends to reduce ﬁscal revenues because
the counterpart of a falling n is an increase in z (i.e., an increase in liabilities of the central bank
held by commercial banks), which increases the government’s debt service. In order to ﬁnance this
fall in revenues, the inﬂation rate (i.e., the rate of depreciation) must increase. This eﬀect tends
to increase i and hence Id. For all ig > ˆ ıg, the higher debt service overwhelms the increase in the
deposit rate, and further increases in ig actually raise Id.
Figure 4 also illustrates part (ii) of this proposition, by showing that the market interest rate,
i, is also a U-shaped function of ig.F o r ig < ¯ ıg, the direct eﬀect on revenues of an increase in
ig (due to a higher demand for real demand deposits) is so large that it facilitates a cut in the
inﬂation tax. However, for ig > ¯ ıg the indirect eﬀect of a fall in n becomes large enough to require
15Also notice that, in this particular case, the condition ensuring that the economy is operating on the correct side









17Figure 4. Initial exchange rate and the nominal interest rate
an increase in π (or equivalently, the rate of money growth µ) in order to ﬁnance ﬁscal spending.
Aside from the non-monotonicity of both the initial level of the exchange rate and the steady-
state depreciation rate, Proposition 1 also shows that an increase in the policy-controlled interest
rate often induces an intertemporal trade-oﬀ in the path of the nominal exchange rate. In particular,
the instantaneous appreciation of the currency that is generated by a higher ig comes at the cost
of a more depreciated level of the nominal exchange rate at some time in the future (relative to the
path with a lower stationary ig). This occurs for values of ig ∈ (¯ ıg,ˆ ıg) because in that range, as
Figure 4 illustrates, a rise in ig reduces E0 but increases the rate of depreciation.
Finally, the results of Proposition 1 also imply that the relationship between the nominal ex-
change rate and the market interest rate is highly non-monotonic. This can be visualized using
Figure 4. For “low” values of ig (i.e., ig < ¯ ıg), both the initial exchange rate (E0)a n dt h em a r k e t
interest rate (i)fall (positive comovement). For “high” values of ig (i.e., ig > ˆ ıg), both increase
(also positive comovement). In contrast, for “intermediate” values of ig,( i . e . ,¯ ıg <i g < ˆ ıg), E0 falls
while i increases, indicating a negative comovement.
184.2.2 Case 2: The two-money case
We now turn to our second special case of the general model. Here, we reintroduce a transactions
role for cash so that st = v(ht)+ψ(dt). Thus, this economy has two liquid assets — cash and
demand deposits. However, we now assume that φ = 0 so that loan demand by ﬁrms is zero (i.e.,
˜ n(Ig) ≡ 0). Hence, there is no output eﬀect of higher interest rates.
After setting ˜ n(Ig) = 0, the equilibrium transfer equation (21) continues to be valid. We
restrict parameter ranges so that the stability condition continues to hold in this case. Hence, the
rate of devaluation remains constant along a convergent perfect foresight equilibrium path.16
The interest elasticity of cash ηh is a function of the nominal interest rate i, which is an implicit
function of the policy controlled interest rate ig through the equilibrium transfer equation (21).
Deﬁne ¯ ıg by the relation ηh
³
˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
1+˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
´
=
R˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)−r. We will now assume that the demands for cash












Condition 2: ηh and ηd are both increasing in their respective arguments.
Condition 1 requires that for “low” inﬂation rates (i.e., inﬂation rates corresponding to a non-
activist interest rate policy), the interest elasticity of cash be lower than that of deposits (adjusted
by the reserve requirement ratio). The idea is that cash is kept mainly for transactions and is
therefore relatively interest inelastic for low inﬂation rates. This intuition is consistent with the
evidence for the United States provided in Moore, Porter, and Small (1990).17
We can now state the main proposition of this section:
Proposition 2 Under Conditions 1 and 2, the initial nominal exchange rate is a non-monotonic
(U-shaped) function of the policy-controlled interest rate, ig. In particular there exists an ˆ ıg ∈ (0,¯ ıg)
such that ∂E0
∂ig Q 0 as ig Q ˆ ıg.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition shows that, as in the previous case, the initial level of the exchange rate is
a U-shaped function of the policy-controlled interest rate. Intuitively, for low values of ig,t h e
positive money demand eﬀect dominates the ﬁscal eﬀect (i.e., the inﬂationary consequences of a
higher ig). Beyond a certain point, however, further increases in ig have such a large impact on the
rate of inﬂation that money demand begins to fall and hence the currency depreciates. The role







17Condition 2 is satisﬁed by, among others, Cagan money demands, which provide the best ﬁt for developing
countries (see Easterly, Mauro, Schmidt-Hebbel (1995)).
19of Condition 1 is to ensure that, around ig = 0, the demand for cash falls by less than the amount
by which demand for bank deposits rises, so that overall real money demand increases.18 Lastly,
Proposition 2 also implies that, for ig < ¯ ıg,ar i s ei nig appreciates the currency on impact but
increases the depreciation rate. Hence, there is again an intertemporal trade-oﬀ in the sense that
ah i g h e rig buys a more appreciated currency in the short-run at the expense of a more depreciated
currency in the future.
5 Calibration
Policy experiments performed in the next section intend to demonstrate the central result of the
paper: the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates may be non-monotonic. Towards
this end we calibrate a discrete time version of the model developed above and assess its quantitative
relevance for understanding the relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate. In this
section we calibrate the parameters of the model as well as the processes for productivity, interest
rate, and ﬁscal policy shocks. For our benchmark calibration we use the data for Argentina during
1983-2002. The model calibration is such that one period in the model corresponds to one quarter.
5.1 Functional forms and parameters









, ξ > 0,
with ξ being the level parameter.
Following Rebelo and Vegh (1995), we assume that the transactions costs functions υ(.)a n d
ψ(.) have quadratic forms given by
sκ
µ





where κ represents cash or demand deposits, κ = {h,d} and sκ are the level parameters. This
formulation implies that the demand for money components are ﬁnite and that transaction costs
are zero when the nominal interest rate is zero.19









18If condition 1 is not satisﬁe d ,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei ni
g w o u l da l w a y sl e a dt oadepreciation of the currency.





Most of our parameter values are borrowed from Neumeyer and Perri (2005). In particular, we
set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σ, to 5, while the curvature of the labor, υ, is set to
1.6, which is within the range of values used in the literature.20 This implies the elasticity of labor
demand with respect to real wage, 1
υ−1, equal to 1.67, consistent with the estimates for the U.S.
Labor weight parameter ζ in the utility function is chosen to match the average working time of
1/5 of total time and is set to 2.48. Subjective discount factor, β, is set to 0.97, as in Uribe and
Yue (2006).
Capital income share, α, is chosen to be equal to 0.38, while a depreciation rate for capital, δ,
of 4.4% per quarter. We calibrate the share of wage bill paid in advance, φ, to be equal to 0.26,
which is chosen to match the ratio of domestic private business sector credit to GDP in Argentina
over our sample period. The number for private credit to GDP in Argentina is borrowed from the
Financial Structure Dataset assembled by Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2000) and is equal to
0.21. The share of business sector credit in the total private sector credit is calculated using activity
based ﬁnancing reports from the Central Bank of Argentina, and is equal to 78% over our sample
period. Capital adjustment costs parameter ξ is calibrated to replicate the volatility of investment
relative to the volatility of output in Argentina. Parameter θ determines the reserve requirement
ratio in the model and is set to match its value of 0.4 in Argentina.
The level coeﬃcients in the transactions costs technology, sh and sd, are set to 10 and 5,
respectively, in order to match seignorage revenues in Argentina equal to 7% of GDP. This number
is taken from Kiguel (1989) and was used by Rebelo and Vegh (1995) to calibrate the transaction
costs technology. We follow their strategy in our calibration exercise. Parameters sh and sd also
allow us to pin down the initial values of money demand elasticities, ηh and ηd, such that Condition
1 in Section 4.2.2 is satisﬁed. The proportional cost parameter φn in the banking sector’ problem
is chosen to match the average spread of nominal lending rate over money market rate equal 10%
in Argentina over our sample period. Lastly, we pick γ to match the economy-wide steady state
bond holdings. Table 1 summarizes parameter values under our benchmark parametrization.21
20For example, Mendoza (1991) uses υ equal to 1.455 for Canada, while Correia, et.al (1995) set υ to 1.7 for
Portugal.
21For all the experiments reported below we checked to ensure that the implied inﬂation tax revenues are on the
upward sloping portion of the Laﬀer-curve.
21Table 1. Benchmark parameter values
preferences
discount factor β 0.971
risk-aversion σ 5
labor curvature υ 1.6
labor weight ζ 2.48
technology
capital income share α 0.38
depreciation rate δ 0.044
share of wage-in-advance φ 0.26
capital adjustment costs ξ 4.5
money
reserve requirement θ 0.4
transaction cost technology
P
κ=h,d sκ(κ2 − κ +1 /4) sh =1 0 ,s d =5
banks cost technology γ 1
per unit loans costs φn 0.1
5.2 Calibration of the shock processes
There are two sources of uncertainty in our benchmark model: exogenous productivity realizations,
A, and the policy-controlled interest rate realizations, ig. We now describe how we calibrate the
total factor productivity (TFP) and the process for interest rates. We will use a “hat” over a
variable to denote the deviation of that variable from its balanced growth path.
Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005) we assume that productivity, ˆ At, in Argentina is an
independent AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient, ρa, equal to 0.95. The innovations,
εa, to this process are assumed to be independent and identically normally distributed with the
standard deviation, σ(εa), equal to 0.0195.22
To calibrate the process for the policy-controlled interest rate ig, we use data on the money
market rate in Argentina during 1992:2-2002:3. During this period the average level of ig was 13%.
We obtain ˆ ıg as a diﬀerential of Argentinean money market rate from the U.S. T-bill rate, and then
22This process is commonly used to describe total factor productivity in the U.S. In the absence of quarterly data
on Argentinean employment, we rely on it to calibrate the dynamics of ˆ At, as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
22estimate the ﬁrst-order autoregressive process for ˆ ıg as
ˆ ı
g







t are i.i.d. normal innovations. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of this equation
gives ρg =0 .97, and σ(εg)=0 .0353.23
To simplify the analytics of the model, up to now we have assumed that the lump-sum transfers
paid by the government to the private sector, τ, are ﬁxed at ¯ τ. We measure ¯ τ as the average
(seasonally-adjusted) ratio of government consumption to GDP over our sample period, which
gives ¯ τ = 13%.24
Once the shock processes and other parameter values are set, we solve the model using the
perturbation method (Judd (1998), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)). In particular, we take the
second-order approximations of the model equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady
state, and then solve the resulting system of equations following the procedure described in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). 25
6R e s u l t s
We analyze the equilibrium properties of the model by conducting a series of three experiments.
First, we perform the steady state comparisons of our model for diﬀerent levels of policy-controlled
interest rate. Second, we discuss how the variables in the model respond to temporary interest rate
shocks of diﬀerent magnitudes; and third, we compare the model responses to same sized interest
rate shocks, but for diﬀerent steady state levels of the interest rate.
23Measuring ˆ ı
g as a deviation of the money market rate from world interest rate proxied by U.S. T-bill rate is
consistent with the VAR speciﬁcation reported in Section 2. Moreover, it also provides a detrend of the interest rate
data.
24As part of a sensitivity analysis we relaxed the assumption of a ﬁxed τ and evaluated the model’s implications
when the process for ﬁscal spending is stochastic. We found that the exchange rate response to ﬁscal shocks are
m o n o t o n i cb o t hi nl e v e l sa n dr a t e s .
25In our economy, international bonds may follow a unit root process. To account for this potential non-stationarity,





yt − ¯ a
´2
, where ¯ a denotes the steady state ratio of
bond holdings to GDP, and ϑ is a level parameter. This does not alter the model dynamics substantially, and therefore
when discussing the results, we focus on the case with no bond holding costs.
236.1 Steady state comparative statics
Figures 5 and 6 present the results of our ﬁrst experiment. Figure 5 shows the responses of the steady
state level of exchange rate and the rate of currency depreciation to changes in the steady state level
of the policy-controlled interest rate, ig. Both variables exhibit a non-monotonic relationship with
ig. Small increases in ig appreciate the currency and reduce the rate of currency depreciation; more
aggressive increases in ig depreciate the currency and increase the rate of currency depreciation.
The intuition for this result can be gained by using the analytical insights derived in section 4.
In particular, consider Figure 6. It summarizes the steady state responses of the money demand, its
components, and opportunity costs to changes in the steady state level of policy-controlled interest
rate, ig. An increase in ig has three eﬀects in our model. First, higher ig creates an inﬂationary
pressure on the government by increasing the interest burden on the outstanding government debt.
This “ﬁscal” eﬀect raises the required seignorage revenues and tends to increase the rate of currency
depreciation and thus the nominal interest rate, i.
Second is the “output” eﬀect, which arises due to the working capital constraint in this economy.
When ig rises, the cost of borrowing faced by the ﬁrm goes up, leading to lower employment and
output. With lower outstanding loans, banks increase their holdings of government bonds to
balance their balance sheets. This increases the government’s ﬁscal burden and raises the required
seignorage revenue to ﬁnance the budget. Thus, both the “ﬁscal” and “output” eﬀects will push
the market interest rate, i, up.
Our third eﬀect is the “money demand” eﬀect. It captures the response of the money base,
m(= h+θd), to changes in domestic interest rates. With higher i, the opportunity cost of holding
cash rises, thus lowering the demand for cash by households. At the same time, an increase in ig is
accompanied by an increase in the interest paid on demand deposits, id. Lower opportunity costs
of holding deposits lead to a higher demand for deposits, which, as can be seen from Figure 6 is
monotonically rising in ig. The response of money demand, and thus the direction of the “money
demand” eﬀect, depends on which component dominates. For low steady state levels of ig the
increase in demand deposits is large enough to swamp the fall in cash demand, and leads to an
appreciation in the level of the currency. It is also strong enough to counterweight the “ﬁscal” and
“output” eﬀects, thus reducing the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. For high levels of ig,
deposits do not respond suﬃciently to overtake the negative eﬀect on cash demand coming through
the ﬁscal and output eﬀects. As a result, both the level and the rate of change of the exchange
24rate go up. For intermediate levels of ig (i.e., 0.08 ≤ ig ≤ 0.22 in our benchmark calibration), there
exists an intertemporal trade-oﬀ in the path of the nominal exchange rate. In particular, the level
of exchange rate continues to appreciate, but comes with a higher rate of currency depreciation.
Figure 5. Steady state comparisons: Exchange rate level and rate of change
Overall, we get a hump-shaped response of the money base in the economy and, therefore, a
U-shaped response in the level of exchange rate. The response of the rate of currency depreciation,
and thus the nominal interest rate, is also U-shaped, but reaches its minimum for a lower steady
state ig.26 As was highlighted in section 4, the key property of the model needed to generate such
responses is that the elasticity of money demand is rising in the opportunity cost of holding money.
Our calibration also ensures that the deposit elasticity for low ig is greater than the elasticity of
cash demand, which is also required for non-monotonicity.
It is informative to evaluate the eﬀect of the level of ¯ τ on the exchange rate non-monotonicities.
Figure 7 presents the steady state comparisons of the exchange rate and its rate of change for
¯ τ = 15%. The latter change increases the ﬁscal burden. As a result, the U-shape in the response of
the rate of exchange rate depreciation becomes more pronounced; the minimum steady state level
in the responses of both the exchange rate level and the rate shifts to the right.
26Since demand for cash is a monotonically decreasing function of i, and under our benchmark parametrization, i
i saU - s h a p e df u n c t i o no fi
g, cash demand is a hump-shaped function of i
g as panel (b) of Figure 5 shows.
25Figure 6. Steady state comparisons: Money demand and opportunity costs
6.2 Temporary shocks around diﬀerent steady state ig’s
Our remaining two experiments study the dynamics of the model around its non-stochastic steady
state. First, we look at the impulse responses of the exchange rate and the rate of currency
depreciation to a positive one standard deviation innovation to the policy-controlled interest rate
ig. We conduct this experiment for diﬀerent steady state levels of ig. The results of this exercise
are presented in Figure 8.
For the benchmark parameterization with low steady state interest rates, a temporary increase
in ig tends to appreciate the currency. Under high steady state interest rates, on the other hand, a
temporary increase in ig has the reverse eﬀect: both the level and the rate of currency depreciation
increase. This comovement between the level and the rate of the exchange rate breaks down for
intermediate levels of the steady state interest rate. Here a positive one standard deviation shock
to ig will generate an appreciation in the nominal exchange rate, accompanied by an increase in
the rate of depreciation. The market interest rate also rises in this range. These results show that
interest rates (both policy-controlled and market determined) and exchange rates can be positively
or negatively related. Hence, if one were to conduct a similar exercise for a cross-section of countries
with diﬀerent initial levels of interest rates no systematic relationship between the two variables
need necessarily arise.
26Figure 7. Steady state comparisons: Higher level of τ =1 5 %
6.3 Diﬀerent sized shocks to steady state ig
Finally, we turn to our last experiment in which we study the impulse responses of interest rates
and exchange rates to innovations in ig of diﬀerent sizes. We analyze these responses around an
invariant steady state ig. We calibrate the steady state ig to the average money market rate in
Argentina over 1992:2-2002:3, equal to 13%. The results are presented in Figure 9.
It is easy to see that increases in interest rates up to 3 standard deviations cause the domestic
currency to appreciate. However, more aggressive rises in ig would lead to currency depreciation.
The rate of currency depreciation and the nominal interest rate always increase in response to
interest rate shocks, independent of the magnitude of the shock. The reason is that for relatively
high levels of steady state ig (13% in our case), the interest burden of government debt is so high
that it requires large seigniorage revenues to maintain the government budget. Therefore, the
steady state inﬂation rate and the rate of currency depreciation are also high. Any further increase
in ig raises the interest rate burden, thereby increasing the inﬂation rate some more. The money
demand, on the other hand, continues to exhibit non-monotonicity in response to changes in ig. In
particular, at ig = 13%, the elasticity of demand for deposits is suﬃciently high, while the cash
elasticity is suﬃciently low to generate a net increase in money demand for small innovations to
ig. This positive “money demand” eﬀect will appreciate the currency. However, when innovations
to ig become large, the “money demand” eﬀect turns negative. As a result, the domestic currency
depreciates. These ﬁndings highlight that the non-monotonicity in the relation between interest
27Figure 8. Transitions: Diﬀerent steady state ig
rates and exchange rates exists on the time-series basis as well.
In summary, we have shown that the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates is
non-monotonic along three dimensions: First, the relationship is non-monotonic in the steady state;
second, controlling for the steady state, the relationship is non-monotonic in the size of the interest
rate changes. Lastly, controlling for the size of the innovations, the relationship is non-monotonic
along the cross-sectional dimension.
7 Matching country impulse responses
This section describes the ﬁnal test of our model. Consider again the empirical impulse responses
presented at the beginning of the paper. We used those impulse responses to illustrate that it is
hard to ﬁnd any systematic relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in the data.
For instance, we showed that for Thailand, a positive innovations to the interest rate diﬀerential
induced a signiﬁcant exchange rate appreciation. Korea, on the other hand, exhibited a depreciated
exchange rate in response to an interest rate innovation. Finally, Brazil’s exchange rate has shown
no signiﬁcant reaction to a change in interest rate diﬀerential. The objective of this section is to
rationalize these opposite dynamics in the context of our model. For this purpose, we re-calibrate
our model for Thailand, Korea and Brazil, and derive their corresponding theoretical impulse
responses to interest rate innovations. We conduct this exercise for the two periods over which our
28Figure 9. Transitions: Diﬀerent size of shocks to ig,i
g
ss = 13%.
chosen economies had ﬂexible exchange rate regime: 1997-2001 which corresponds to a period of
active interest rate defence in these economies; and the complete sample period of 1997-2007. We
show that our model can qualitatively match the data for both periods.
The choice of the periods were dictated by two motivations. The ﬁrst sub-period (1997-2001)
was characterized by a number of currency crisis episodes in emerging countries. During this period
the interest rate instrument was used very actively by these countries as a weapon to ﬁght attacks
on domestic currencies. The period from 2001 onward, on the other hand, has been one of relative
tranquility. As a result the use of the interest rate instrument has been more active. Thus, during
the period 1997-2001 the mean interest rate is about 340 basis points higher and the standard
deviation of the interest rates is 40 percent higher relative to the full sample (1997-2007). Second,
after 2001 there was a big and prolonged change in the US monetary policy with the Federal
Funds rate dropping sharply in response to a developing recession. As a result, during the period
1997-2001 the mean level of the federal funds rate was about 170 basis points higher, while the
standard deviation was 70 percent lower relative to the entire period of 1997-2007. Given that a
key exogenous driver in the model is the spread between the policy controlled domestic interest rate
29and the exogenous world interest rate, both facts outlined above suggest that the properties of this
spread may have changed signiﬁcantly after 2001. Moreover, our counterfactual policy experiments
above showed that the properties of the interest rate process are key components of potential non-
monotonicities in the exchange rate response to interest rate innovations. Hence, studying the two
periods separately appears to be a natural test of the model.
7.1 Active interest rate period
We keep all of the preference parameters and most of the technology and money parameters un-
changed. We only recalibrate two key parameters: the share of wage-in-advance, φ, to match
the ratio of domestic business credit to GDP; and the reserve requirement ratio, θ, in our three
economies.27 In calibrating all parameters and shock processes we use the time periods considered
in the construction of the empirical impulse responses: 1997:q3 - 2001:q1 for Thailand and Korea;
and 1998:q4 - 2001:q1 for Brazil. 28
As before, we measure i
g
t as the money market rate in a given country. During the sample
periods the average level of ig was 7% for Thailand, 9% for Korea, and 23% for Brazil. To calibrate
the process for the policy-controlled interest rate, we estimate a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process
on ˆ ı
g
t, an interest rate diﬀerential between the money market rate in a given country and a U.S.
Federal Funds rate for a panel of three countries. We restrict this process to be the same across
the three countries we consider. This approach is intended to capture the dynamics of ˆ ı
g
t in an
average emerging market economy. It also allows us to isolate cross-country diﬀerences in exchange
rate dynamics driven by a limited set of structural country characteristics. We ﬁnd ρg =0 .92
and σ(ε
g
t)=0 .0413.29 Finally, we also calculate country-speciﬁc values for the lump-sum transfers
27The numbers for private credit to GDP in Thailand, Korea and Brazil are borrowed from the Financial Structure
Dataset assembled by Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2000) as in the case of Argentina. The share of business
credit in total private credit is calculated using the ﬁnancial institutions reports from the Bank of Thailand, Korea
and the Central Bank of Brazil. These numbers are 66% for Korea, 67% for Thailand, and 78% for Brazil. The
reserve requirement ratios for these countries are calculated following Brock (1989). See web appendix for detailed
data sources (available at http://www.econ.ubc.ca/vhnatkovska/research.htm). We also raise the value of φ
n for
Thailand to 0.13 from 0.10 in order to ensure that the relevant interest rate spreads remain positive.
28We should note that due to the small number of observations in the 1997-2001 subsample we had to use monthly
data in our empirical VARs. We continue using monthly data in our empirical estimation on the full 1997-2007
sample in order to retain comparability of results.
29We also estimated country-speciﬁcp r o c e s s e sf o rˆ ı
g, and found them to be along the lines of the aggregate
estimates.
30from the government to the private sector, ¯ τ. As before, we measure ¯ τ as the average ratio of
government consumption to GDP over the corresponding sample period. The new parameter
values are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Parameter values: Thailand, Korea, Brazil for 1997-2001
Thailand Korea Brazil
share of wage-in-advance, φ 1.11 0.72 0.36
reserve requirement, θ 0.03 0.03 0.27
Average ig 7% 9% 23%
Average τ 11% 12% 20%
We solve the model under these new parameterizations and generate the responses of the ex-
change rate to the interest rate innovations. The resulting impulse responses along with the corre-
sponding data impulse responses are presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10 shows that our model delivers impulse responses that qualitatively match those in the
data: The exchange rate appreciates in Thailand, depreciates in Korea, and exhibits no signiﬁcant
change in Brazil following a one standard deviation innovation to interest rate. The opposing re-
sponses of exchange rates in Korea and Thailand are especially striking given that the two countries
are very similar along a number of dimensions: the steady state levels of ig and τ; the process for
ig; as well as most of the structural parameters. The key diﬀerence between the two countries
in the context of our model is in the level of business loans to GDP, captured by the parameter
31φ. This parameter determines the strength of the output eﬀect through working capital cost; and
aﬀects the intensity of the money demand eﬀect through the steady state levels of interest rates in
the model. In Thailand, where the share of private credit is larger, the money demand eﬀect of φ
dominates and the exchange rate appreciates. The opposite is true in Korea leading to depreciated
exchange rate.
The success of our model, however, is not limited to capturing the behavior of exchange rate.
We want to ensure that matching dynamics of exchange rates in our model does not come at
the expense of unrealistic dynamics of other variables. This is not the case. We again return
to the empirical VARs estimated at the beginning of the paper. Besides the exchange rate the
estimated VAR systems also included output and ﬁscal balance to capture, respectively, the output
and ﬁscal eﬀect of interest rate changes. Here we present the empirical impulse responses of
output and ﬁscal balance and compare them with their theoretical counterparts. Figure 11 shows
the impulse response of output to interest rate shocks, while Figure 12 shows the corresponding
impulse responses for the ﬁscal balance in the three countries. The left-hand-side panel of Figure
11 shows that both Korea and Brazil experienced a contraction in industrial production following
ap o s i t i v ei n t e r e s tr a t ei n n o v a t i o n .T h eo u t put response in Thailand is more mixed as it ﬂuctuates
around zero. The right-hand-side panel of Figure 11 shows that in the model Thai, Korean and
Brazilian output decline after a positive interest rate shock. The ﬁgures suggest that the model
does well in reproducing the output response in Korea and Brazil to interest rate innovations while
it fails to do so for Thailand.
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Figure 12 shows the response of the ﬁscal balance to a positive innovation in the interest rates
32in our three countries. The model produces a worsening ﬁscal balance in all three countries while
in the data the evidence is mixed. The ﬁscal balance worsens in Korea, improves in Thailand and
ﬂuctuates around zero in Brazil. While the model doesn’t reproduce the ﬁscal responses in Brazil
and Thailand, it does reproduce the ordering of the ﬁscal responses.
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In this subsection we aim to verify whether our model is successful in capturing the interest rate-
exchange rate interplay when interest rates instruments are not actively used by a country’s poli-
cymakers. For this purpose we repeat the exercise in the previous subsection for the full sample of
1997-2007. Table 3 summarizes the updated model parameters.
Table 3. Parameter values: Thailand, Korea, Brazil for 1997-2007
Thailand Korea Brazil
share of wage-in-advance, φ 0.9 0.73 0.31
reserve requirement, θ 0.03 0.03 0.176
Average ig 4.1% 6% 19%
Average τ 11% 13% 20%
The key diﬀerence from the parameters in the short sample is lower steady state level for ig,
as well as more stable dynamics for ig in all three countries. Furthermore, Thailand and Brazil
experienced a fall in the share of business sector credit in total credit, which lead to lower parameter
33φ. That number for Korea became slightly higher. We also re-calibrate the process for ig and ﬁnd
ρg =0 .95 and σ(ε
g
t)=0 .0276. As before, we restrict this process to be the same across our three
economies. Lastly, we set φn =0 .14 in all three countries.
Figure 13 contrasts the empirical and model-generated impulse responses of the exchange rate
to interest rate shocks. In the data the exchange rate depreciates in response to an increase in the
interest rate for all three countries. The model impulse responses replicate precisely this pattern
as well as the size-ordering of the individual country responses.
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We also compare the model and data impulse responses of output and the ﬁscal balance to
interest rate innovations in these countries. The left panel of Figure 14 shows the impulse response
of output to a one standard deviation interest rate innovation while the right panel shows the
corresponding impulse responses generated by the model. Both in the model and the data output
falls on impact in all three countries. As in the shorter sample, the model does well in reproducing
the data in terms of the response of output to interest rate innovations in Brazil and Korea but
fails to pick up the relative lack of a response in Thailand.
Figure 15 depicts the data and model generated impulse response for the ﬁscal balance. For all
three countries the ﬁscal balance clearly worsens on impact both in the data and the model.
Overall, we interpret the evidence in Figures 10-15 as being supportive of the margins isolated
in the model. Given that the model was not calibrated to match impulse responses and the fact that
the parameterization was changed along just three dimensions for these three countries, we ﬁnd
the results to be very encouraging for the ability of the model to explain exchange rate dynamics
in diﬀerent countries.
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The relationship between interest rates and the exchange rate has been the focus of a spirited
academic and policy debate for a long time. This paper has developed a simple model to rationalize
the mixed and often conﬂicting results that have been obtained by a large body of empirical work
in this area. We have shown — both analytically and numerically — that the relationship between
changes in interest rates (both the interest rate controlled by policymakers as well as the market-
determined interest rate) and the level of the exchange rate is inherently non-monotonic. Hence,
there is no reason to expect to ﬁnd a monotonic relationship between the two variables in the data.
To make our points as sharply as possible, in our analytical analysis we have focused on two
particular cases of a general property of this class of monetary models. Our two cases illustrate the
fact that if the government has at least two sources of revenues, then a non-monotonic relationship is
35to be expected. In our numerical analysis we studied the full version of the model that encompasses
all three eﬀects. We have shown that the non-monotonicity in the relation between interest rates
and exchange rates exists along both the cross-sectional (in response to the interest rate changes
around diﬀerent steady state levels) and the time-series (in response to the diﬀerent magnitude
shocks around the same steady state) dimensions. In sum, we believe that these non-monotonic
results are quite general and not speciﬁc to the particular formulation that we may have chosen.
The analysis in our model has treated the policy-controlled interest rate as an exogenous driving
process. This simpliﬁed treatment of the interest rate allowed us to isolate the channels through
which it can aﬀect the nominal exchange rate. While being convenient for our purposes, this simpli-
ﬁcation is clearly unrealistic. Understanding equilibrium exchange rate dynamics in an environment
with endogenous interest rate policy is an area that we intend to pursue in future work.
36Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Since the nominal money supply is given at time 0, any change in m0 due to a change in Id
0
has to be accommodated by a change in the exchange rate E0 in the opposite direction. Hence, to
uncover the eﬀect of ig on E0 we need to determine the eﬀect of ig on Id
0.S i n c e Id = i − id we
need to ﬁrst determine the sign of ∂i
∂ig. After setting ˜ h(i) = 0, we can totally diﬀerentiate (21) to


























































implicit solution for i as ˜ ı(ig;¯ τ).
We can substitute ˜ ı(ig;¯ τ)i n t oIg to implicitly solve for Ig















χ1 (1 + i)
> 0. (23)









stability condition. Deﬁne ˆ ıg such that ˆ Ig = ˜ Ig(ˆ ıg;¯ τ).
Using equation (22) along with the deﬁnition of Id and the equilibrium relation id =( 1− θ)ig
we can derive the implicit function Id















χ1 (1 + i)
. (24)
Under our assumed production function for ﬁrms (equation (6) the steady state loan demand is given











. Using this to solve for ηn (= − ˜ n0
n
ig−i
1+i )i ne q u a t i o n


























,t h e n∂˜ Id
∂Ig < 0f o rl o wv a l u e so f Ig
1+i but ∂˜ Id












ˆ Ig. The proof then follows from the fact that ∂˜ Ig/∂ig > 0.
(ii) From (i) above we know that ∂i
∂ig
¯ ¯
ig=ˆ ıg =( 1− θ)
³
1+˜ ı(ˆ ıg,¯ τ)
1+(1−θ)ˆ ıg
´

















R by assumption and χ1 > 0 from the stability condi-
tion, it directly follows from equation (22) that ∂i
∂ig > 0 for all ig ≥ ˆ ıg.
37Is it possible for ∂i








R is monotonically increasing in ig.S i n c en is monotonically decreasing in ˜ Ig and













is monotonically falling in ig for all ig. We also know from part (i) of this proposition that d is
increasing with ig for ig < ˆ ıg since ∂˜ Id




















It is easy to check that
∂ηd
∂˜ Id > 0 (a maintained assumption) is a suﬃcient condition for A to be
decreasing in ig for ig < ˆ ıg. This implies that the ﬁrst term in the numerator is (1 − θ)d[1 − A]i s
mononically increasing in ig for all ig < ˆ ıg (since d is also rising with ig in this range). Combining












θn is monotonically decreasing in ig for all ig
implies that the numerator of equation (22) is monotonically increasing in ig for all ig < ˆ ıg. Hence,
as we lower ig below ˆ ıg, the numerator of equation (22) falls monotonically. By arguments of
continuity, there exists an ¯ ıg < ˆ ıg such that ∂i
∂ig R 0 for all ig R ¯ ıg.30
(iii) From (i) and (ii) we know that for ig ∈ (¯ ıg,ˆ ıg)a ni n c r e a s ei nig appreciates the currency
on impact but also increases the steady-state depreciation rate.
B Proof of Proposition 2
















































30It is fairly easy to restrict parameters such that ¯ I
g > 0w h e r e¯ I
g = ˜ I
g(¯ ı
g,¯ τ). This restriction is necessary to
guarantee a non-monotonicity of i within the permissible range of I
g.









R (which we imposed to














where ˜ Id = i−id
1+i and where χ2 is given by equation (26).
To determine the relationship between the level of the nominal exchange rate and ig we need to

























Since i is always rising in ig, demand for cash (h) is always falling in ig. Hence, m must necessarily
fall with a higher ig if demand deposits are non-increasing in ig. Noting that the interest elasticity
of cash ηh is a function of the nominal interest rate i,d e ﬁne ¯ ıg by the relation ηh
³
˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
1+˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
´
=
R˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)
˜ ı(¯ ıg,¯ τ)−r. Hence, from equation (27) we have ∂˜ Id
∂ig
¯ ¯ ¯
















ig=0 > 0. First, note that since i is increasing in ig from equation (25) and
∂ηh
∂i > 0( f r o m






















































Hence, Condition 1 is suﬃcient for ∂m
∂ig
¯ ¯
ig=0 > 0. Moreover, ∂i
∂ig > 0a n d
∂ηh











is rising in ig.M o r e o v e r , f o r a l l ig < ¯ ıg we know from above that
∂˜ Id
∂ig < 0. From Condition 2
∂ηd
∂˜ Id > 0. Hence, ηd must be falling with ig for all ig < ¯ ıg.B ya r g u m e n t s
of continuity, there must therefore exist an ˆ ıg such that ∂m
∂ig
¯ ¯
ig=ˆ ıg = 0. The proof is completed
by noting that E0 = M0/mand that nominal money supply at time 0 is given (see equation (15)).
Hence, E0 moves inversely with m.
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